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Abstract
What is behind the economic depression Brazil experienced within 2014-
2016? Using a synthetic control estimations we find that its roots are domes-
tic. With that in mind, we apply the business cycle accounting method and
find that the episode was driven by the efficiency wedge. The econometric
evidence reveals that the public development bank outlays have a positive
(negative) impact in the short (long) run in the efficiency wedge. A dynamic
general equilibrium model with financial frictions and a public development
bank is able to reproduce the dynamics of output during the crisis.
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1 Introduction
There are repeated periods during which real GDP falls, the most dramatic instance
being the early 1930s. Such periods are called recessions if they are mild and
depressions if they are more severe.
Gregory N. Mankiw.1
After the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) hitting the world economy, the recov-
ery from the episode was different between developed and emerging market
economies. In Brazil, for instance, it was a two-quarters contraction in 2009. Af-
ter the fall, the economy bounced back and GDP increased 7,5% in 2010 over the
previous year (see Figure ??). However, after 2011, growth rates trended down-
wards. In 2014 the growth rate close-to-zero growth and marked a period of a
severe recession or, as it is called in this paper, a depression.
What happened within 2010-2016? The aim of this paper is to understand
the drivers of the episode. With that in mind, the first question that arises is the
following: was it a domestic problem or the consequence of the international
environment? The evidence points to the former. The fall in the Brazilian GDP
was stronger that the one that would have occurred solely from international
factors.
Given the previous result, we can access what drove output towards a two-
years depression without a major disruptive event. By applying the Business
Cycles Accounting (BCA) method, we find that the efficient wedge accounts for
almost all the variation in output.
The importance of earmarked credit in Brazil at the time raise the possibility
that the efficiency wedge responds to loans of the federal public development
bank. As a result, an increase in the development bank outlays has a positive
impact on the efficiency wedge in the short run. However, this is more than
offset by a negative impact a few quarters after the shock.
The intuition is the following. At first, by accumulating capital in a publicly-
1Mankiw (2010).
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financed sector, total production may rise just due to the allocation of capital
into subsided projects (generating an efficiency wedge). However, in the sec-
ond period, if the credit was allocated to projects with low returns, aggregate
productivity decreases.
A dynamic general equilibrium model with credit market frictions and a
public bank is able to reproduce output dynamics and help us to understand
the episode. By combining the results, we conclude that the depression is a
combination of lagged negative impacts of public lending, which were cut and
generated a negative short-run impact. Furthermore, household and firms’ debt
made the recovery slower than past episodes.
This paper is organized as follows. Besides this introduction, the next section
presents some data on the Brazilian economy. In Section 3 we address whether
the depression arises from domestic or international issues by creating a syn-
thetic control fro Brazil. In Section 4 we present the results of the BCA method
and a econometric analysis between public development bank outlays and the
efficiency wedge. We provide both a simple model for the intuition of the results
as well as a complete DSGE model with financial frictions to account for the dy-
namics of the depression. Finally, the last section is destined to further remarks
and conclusions.
2 Brazil in the long and the short run
The Brazilian economy has experienced two growth patterns. After two-digit
growth rates of GDP in late sixties and the seventies, the economy was hit by
the second oil shock and the increase of interest rates in the US, leading to a
capital outflow. The deterioration of the balance of payments (which showed
a large current account deficit) revealed not only the external vulnerabilities
accumulated thrououth years, but also that the country but also it seems to have
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lost its capability to sustain high growth for a long time. The subsequent period
marked the beginning lower growth rates (see Figure??).
Figure 1: GDP Growth Rate (%)
Note: data from IBGE.
The 1980s Brazil’s “lost decade" was a combination of high (leading to hyper)
inflation, low development and lower growth. The Latin America debt crisis trig-
gered by the 1982 Mexican default managed to make the situation even worse.
Several attempts to stabilize the economy were made, but only in 1994, with
“The Real Plan", Brazil overcome hyperinflation. However, stabilization alone
was not enough to bring back the 1970s growth rates.
According to the business cycle dating committee (CODACE in the Por-
tuguese acronym), Brazil has experienced nine recessions since the 1980s, be-
sides the one after the Covid-19 crisis (CODACE, 2017). The duration of each
recession has varied from 2 to 11 quarters. The longest recessions were: (1989Q3-
1992Q1) after unsuccessful stabilizing plans and a the impeachment of the pres-
ident elected in the first direct elections after the 1964-1985 military dictatorship;
(2014Q2-2016Q4) also after a presidential impeachment, but the economy was
already stabilized and in a much better shape, though growth rate was trending
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downwards. This latter recession was the second most severe (GDP felt, from
the peak to the through, 8%), without any shock such as from oil prices and
foreign interest rates (1981Q1-1983Q1) or a domestic balance-of-payments crisis
(19981Q1-1999Q1). Table 1 presents CODACE dated recessions.
Table 1: Brazilian Recessions
Period Duration Accumulated Annualized average
(in quarters) growth quarterly growth
1981Q1-1983Q1 9 -8.5% -3.9%
1987Q1-1988Q4 6 -4.2% -2.8%
1989Q3-1992Q1 11 -7.7% -2.9%
1995Q2-1995Q3 2 -2.8% -5.6%
1998Q1-1999Q1 5 -1.1% -0.9%
2001Q2-2001Q4 3 -0.9% -1.1%
2003Q1-2003Q2 2 -1.5% -3.0%
2008Q4-2009Q1 2 -5.1% -10.0%
2014Q2-2016Q4 11 -8.0% -3.0%
Notes:From Peak to through Source: CODACE.
In the same period (1980-2017), there were eight periods of expansions, each
varying from 2 to 20 quarters. The 1983Q2-1987Q2 registered the higher ac-
cumulated growth, 30%, from through to peak. After a brief 2003Q1-2003Q2
recession (due to the tight monetary and fiscal policy to contain inflation in-
crease and exchange rate depreciation after the 2002 election), Brazil grew for
21 consecutively quarters. The recession after the 2008 financial crisis was brief.
However, the Brazilian depression after 2014 is the only episode of two years
of consecutive fall in GDP, interrupting a twenty-quarters, 22.8 % accumulated
growth period (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Brazilian Expansions
Period Duration Accumulated Annualized average
(in quarters) growth* quarterly growth
1983Q2-1987Q2 17 30.0% 6.4%
1989Q1-1989Q2 2 8.5% 17.7%
1992Q2-1995Q1 12 19.2% 6.0%
1995Q4-1997Q4 9 8.0% 3.5%
1999Q2-2001Q1 8 7.3 % 3.7%
2002Q1-2002Q4 4 5.3% 5.3%
2003Q3-2008Q3 21 30.5% 5.2%
2009Q2-2014Q1 20 23.0% 4.2%
2017Q1-2019Q4 12 5.1% 1.7%
From through to peak; Source: CODACE.
What is behind the 2014 Brazilian depression? The episode may have its
roots in both long and short run macroeconomic dynamics. The data from Penn
World Table 9.0 in Feenstra et al. (2015) may shed some light on the long term
trajectory. The authors estimated how total factor productivity (TFP) evolved
in Brazil from 1950 to 2014. In Figure 2 we can see two major periods of TFP
growth: from 1950 to 1962 and from 1965 to 1980.2
TFP was the main driver of economic cycles from 1970 to 1974 and from 1980
to 1998, whereas capital accumulation was the key factor within 1974 and 1979
(Bugarin et al., 2010). Controlling for the differences between private and public
investment in the 1970s and relative price dynamics (between investment and
consumption goods) from the 1980s, the neoclassical growth model is able to
explain the Brazilian cycles. However, the volatility in consumption, hours and
productivity is not explained by a Real Business Cycle model (Ellery Jr et al.,
2002), opening room for extensions of the basic framework.
What about the short-run forces that explain the fall after 2014? Is it the
2The first period was interrupted due the political conditions at the time. After killing him-
self, the former President Getúlio Vargas left a weak economy to a distrusted-by-the-army vice-
president to govern. It was a time of a short Parliamentarian trial, followed by military coup and
a dictatorship.
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Figure 2: Total Factor Productivity (2011=1)
Source: Penn World Table 9.0.
consequence of global events or rather of domestic choices? With that in mind,
the next section addresses the source of the depression.
3 The nature of the depression
The Brazilian depression emerged within a period where global GDP growth
remained relatively constant. Advanced economy marginally increased its per-
formance from 2014 to 2016, whereas Emerging Market Economies registered
different records according to the region. Table 3 presents IMF data from its
World Economic Outlook report released in October 2020.
While Emerging Asia had a small decrease in growth rates, Latin America
and the Caribbean countries felt from 1.2% to Latin America to minus 1%. This
could raise doubts regarding whether the roots of the depression are domestic
or International (regional, at least). Within Latin America, we have Chile and
Colombia that kept growing (though with decreasing growth rates), and had a
better performance than its neighbors, Argentina and Venezuela. Figure 3 shows
the growth-inflation average performance for selected Latin America countries,
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Table 3: World GDP Growth (%)
Country Group 2014 2015 2016
World 3.5 3.4 3.3
Advanced economies 2.1 2.4 1.8
Emerging and developing Asia 6.8 6.8 6.8
Emerging and developing Europe 1.8 1.0 2.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.3 0.4 -0.6
Argentina -2.5 2.7 -2.1
Chile 1.8 2.3 1.7
Colombia 4.5 3.0 2.1
Venezuela -3.9 -6.2 -17.0
Brazil 0.5 -3.5 -3.3
Notes: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October
2020.
where sphere sizes are due to PPP adjusted per capita GDP.
Figure 3: Growth and inflation after the 2008 crisis
Notes: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016;
author’s elaboration. Real GDP average growth from 2010 to 2016, average CPI inflation from
2010 to 2016. Spheres size is given by PPP adjusted per capita GDP.
If it was a global force holding Latin America back, one could expect a change
in Brazilian growth rates similar to what happened in the other countries of
the region. However, since they have a very distinct track records, perhaps the
difference in (the change in) growth rates within countries is more a consequence
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of domestic policies and shocks. The next section provides some evidence of the
latter.
3.1 A synthetic Brazil
The synthetic control method may help answer the following question: is the
depression a result of a domestic or an international dynamics? One might
wonder whether there may be a combination of economic policies (domestic
source) causing the depression. If this is the case, a “treatment-control group”
approach could be used to investigate the issue. The difficulty is that we cannot
use a proper “control” group, since there are no “two Brazils” to work with. One
approach could be to select a group of countries and use them as the control
group. But which countries? Are their weight in the group the same? Instead
of choosing arbitrarily the “control" group, a data-driven procedure is applied
following Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015).
Let us work with j = 1, ..., J + 1 units (countries), where j = 1 is the country
we are studying (i.e., Brazil) and the other j = 2 to j = J + 1 are the “candidates"
for comparison. In a balanced panel, data for Latin America and Caribbean
countries are gathered at t periods. Define T0 as the pre-intervention period
and T1 as the post-intervention periods, with T = T0 + T1. The pre-intervention
period is defined from 2000 to 2010, whereas the post-intervention period is from
2011 to 2015, since in 2011 there was an economic policy regime change with the
new government.
A “synthetic Brazil” is built by averaging countries within the sample, with
the vector W = (w2, ..., wJ+1)′, with 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 representing the weight of each
country.3 Define Y1 as the (k × 1) vector with the pre-intervention values for
Brazilian characteristics (in this case: inflation, GDP growth from 2000 to 2010,
government net borrowing and current account balance) and let Y0 be the (k × j)
3See Table 6 for the list of the 32 countries and appendix for data details.
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matrix of pre-intervention values for the characteristics of the other countries
in the sample. The contribution of each country (the vector W) is obtained by
minimizing the difference between observed Brazilian annual GDP growth in









where vm is the relative importance of the m − th variable, which is choosen as
a cross-validation method following Abadie et al. (2015). Using IMF’s data, the
synthetic Brazil is composed by the weighted average of Belize (0.089), Ecuador
(0.091), Guyana (0.178) Mexico (0.254), Peru (0.355) and Venezuela (0.033). Figure
?? presents the pre/post 2011 behavior of observed GDP growth for actual and
synthetic Brazil.
Figure 4: Brazilian GDP growth: actual and synthetic
Note: Data from IMF.
The black line represents the data for observed Brazilian GDP annual growth.
The solid gray line is the synthetic Brazil (the “control group”). The upper and
lower bounds (point estimations +/- 1.96 standard deviation) for the synthetic
estimation are the dashed lines. As we can see, the “treated” series is below
the lower bound in 2015. The results corroborate with the hypothesis that a
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deceleration would happen, as part of a global (or at least regional) movement,
however, if this was only (or the main) reason, it would not be as not as strong
and recessive as the observed figures. It seems a domestic issue after all. The
next section aims to understand the drivers of the depression.
4 The transmission of the depression
The 2014-2016 Brazilian depression is one of the two longest episodes since 1981
and with second deepest accumulated GDP fall. This sections addresses the is-
sue of what has been driving output since 2011. The investigation of the dynam-
ics of the depression imposes some challenges, since there are several possible
mechanisms available to explain the episode. Therefore, the BCA method may
help us to understand the depression.
The starting point is the neoclassical growth model. There are four main
decisions: how much to produce, how much to work, how much to consume
and how to share the resources. There are optimal choices for each decision
and possible deviations from the optimality. The distortions in each decision are
called wedges: the efficiency wedge, the labor wedge, the investment wedge and
the government consumption wedge, respectively.
Following Chari et al. (2007), the prescriptions of the neoclassical model are
confronted with data and the wedges are estimated. The wedges are assumed
to be exogenous and the four wedges account for the whole data by construc-
tion. The business cycle accounting estimates the contribution of each wedge by
letting it fluctuate while remaining other wedges constant. Therefore, it is possi-
ble to identify the promise distortions driving short-run fluctuation. After that,
there are mappings from the prototype economy to a class of detailed models so
further analysis can be used with DSGE models that fit stylized facts.
Brinca et al. (2020) present a survey on BCA literature findings, mappings
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and extensions, for instance, Šustek (2011) introduces monetary issues (inflation
and interest rates). Otsu (2010b), Lama (2011) and Hevia (2014) expand BCA to
a open-economy setup and the relationship between economies is addressed in
Otsu (2010a).
The drivers of business cycles in Emerging Market Economies were studied
using BCA in several papers.4 For instance, Hevia (2014) and Sarabia (2008)
(Mexico), Simonovska & Söderling (2008) (Chile) Hnatkovska & Koehler-Geib
(2015) (Paraguay), He et al. (2009) studies China and Gao & Ljungwall (2009)
compare it with India. Financial crises in Asia are analyzed in Cho & Doblas-
Madrid (2013) as well as in Otsu (2010a). Study the relationship between Japan,
Korea and Taiwan, while Kolasa (2013) focuses on Central and Eastern European
countries.
Lama (2011) uses the open-economy extension of BCA to see the drivers of
fluctuations in Latin America. He finds that the efficient and the labor wedges
are the main responsible to account for output falls in Latin America. Chakraborty
& Otsu (2013) uses BCA for analyzing of output fluctuations in BRIC economies.
For Brazil, they have concluded that the investment and the labor wedges played
important roles in the 1990s, whereas the efficiency wedge was the main driver
for Brazil in the 2000s. Graminho (2006) also applies BCA to Brazil. She finds
that both the efficiency and the labor wedges are important for explaining the
output dynamics.
This work complements BCA analysis of Chakraborty & Otsu (2013), Gram-
inho (2006) and Lama (2011) by not only extending the sample period, but also
using i) quartely data and ii) adjusting consumption and investment data by
removing durables goods from the former and adding it to the latter. Next we
4For advanced economies see, Chari et al. (2007) and Ohanian (2010) (US), Bridji (2013)
(France), Kobayashi & Inaba (2006), Chakraborty (2009), Saijo (2008) (Japan), Kersting (2008) and
Chadha & Warren (2012) (UK), Orsi & Turino (2014) (Italy), Cavalcanti (2007) (Portugal), López
& García (2014) Spain, Sarabia (2007) (Korea); Brinca (2013) (Sweeden). More comprehensive
studies in Brinca (2014), Brinca et al. (2016) and ?
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present the neoclassical growth and the BCA results.
4.1 The Prototype Economy
Consider that a given state of nature, st, has a probability πt(st) of occurrence,
at any time t, where st = (s0, ..., st) represents the history of events up to and
including period t. We take the initial state, s0, as given. Consumers maximize










subject to the budget constraint for all t and st:
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the the law for capital (kt) accumulation:




where (1 − τl,t) is the labor wedge, 1/(1 + τx,t) is the investment wedge, gt is
the government consumption wedge, β is the discount rate, U(.) stands for the
utility function, Nt is the population (with a growth rate of γN), xt is per capita
investment, wt is the real wage rate, rt is the return on capital, δ is the depre-
ciation rate, Tt is per capita lump-sum transfers from the government to house-








b = δ + γ + γn.
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive markets and maximize profits Πt,
12











By combining the optimal decisions of both agents with the production tech-
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where Uc,t, Ul,t, Fl,t, Fk,t and φkt+1 are derivatives of the utility function, the
production function and adjustment costs with respect to its arguments. Opti-
mal decisions are distorted by four wedges: the efficiency wedge (At), the labor
wedge (1− τl,t), the investment wedge (1+ τx,t+1) and the government consump-
tion wedge (gt).
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4.2 Accounting for business cycles in Brazil
The BCA exercises used data from the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter
of 2016.5 Figure ?? presents per worker output, investment, government con-
sumption plus net exports and hours of work for the depression period. There
seems to be two different moments: in the first (2014-2015), the behavior of
macroeconomic variables are similar. Output falls as well as hours of work,
investment and government consumption plus net exports. This seems to cor-
roborate with the synthetic estimation in which for the aforesaid period there
was a more generalized deceleration, i.e. domestic and international drivers for
the GDP fall in Brazil and other Latin America countries (materialized in the
prescribed GDP fall for the synthetic Brazil).
Figure 5: Macroeconomic variables (2014Q1=100)
In the second moment (2015-2016), however, even though hours of work kept
declining at the same rhythm, the output trajectory became steeper, investment
more depressed and government consumption plus net exports increased.6
5See the appendix for more details.
6Net exports tend to be counter-cyclical and follow exchange rate depreciation, whereas in
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Figure 6: Estimated HP-filtered wedges for the Brazilian economy
Figure ?? presents all wedges. We can see that both the efficiency and the
labor wedges felt during the depression, while the investment wedge, as well as
the government consumption wedge rose.
After estimating the wedges, the trajectory of output is simulated. Figure 7
presents two sets of simulations. In the top graphs there are the “one wedge
economies", in which economies are simulated by allowing one wedge to fluctu-
ate, while the others remain constant. In the bottom graphs there are the “one
wedge off economies", in which economies are simulated by holding one wedge
constant and allowing the other to fluctuate.
As we can see, the simulated output path with the efficiency wedge accounts
for almost the whole production dynamics during the 2014-2016 depression. The
some cases fiscal policy may also be counter-cyclical. See Frankel et al. (2013) for a discussion of
fiscal policy in emerging markets.
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Figure 7: Simulated economies during the depression
model with only a labor wedge prescribes a delayed (and softer) recession and
the model with only an investment wedge, even though accounts for the initial
fall, presents a faster output recovery. Finally, output does not fall in the model
with only the government consumption wedge.
Regarding the “one wedge off" simulations, the performance after removing
the efficiency wedge is the worst among the four cases. The other three follow
the observed output fall, even though the accuracy changes among them. Both
one wedge and one wedge off simulations seem to corroborate the hypothesis of
a TFP depression. Formally, we can test it with some statistics. Table 4 presents
four of them: success ratio, linear correlation, root mean-square error (RMSE)




1/ ∑t(yt − yi,t)
2
∑j(1/ ∑t(yt − yi,t)2)
where i is the subscript for output prescribed by each model and j is the total
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of models considered. The statistics lies between 0 and 1 and the closest the
value is to 1, the better. Therefore, the value is the contribution of each wedge
for explaining output movements.
Table 4: BCA decomposition statistics
Statistic Efficiency Labor Investment Government
One wedge economies - full sample
Success Ratio 0.790 0.457 0.420 0.185
Correlation 0.858 0.539 -0.406 -0.753
RMSE 0.028 0.078 0.078 0.079
φ
y
i 0.721 0.094 0.094 0.092
One wedge off economies - full sample
Success Ratio 0.407 0.864 0.765 0.963
Correlation -0.230 0.661 0.836 0.992
RMSE 0.077 0.031 0.046 0.009
1 − φyi 0.279 0.906 0.906 0.908
One wedge economies - 2014 depression
Success Ratio 0.727 0.818 0.455 0.000
Correlation 0.989 0.949 -0.589 -0.977
RMSE 0.008 0.131 0.074 0.115
φ
y
i 0.980 0.004 0.012 0.005
One wedge off economies - 2014 depression
Success Ratio 0.545 0.909 0.727 1.000
Correlation -0.089 0.983 0.979 1.000
RMSE 0.104 0.037 0.052 0.010
1 − φyi 0.020 0.996 0.988 0.995
Success ratio: relative frequency when simulated and observed data had the same sign; Linear
correlations between simulated and observed data; RMSE: root of the mean-square error; φ
statistic following Brinca et al. (2016).
The efficiency wedge accounts for 72.1% of output movements in the full
sample and its role increases to 98% in the depression. Moreover, even if previ-
ous business cycles might have been driven by a secondary role of other wedges
(each account for around 9% of output movements), the Brazilian depression is
driven by the efficiency wedge.
4.3 The Brazilian Quantitative Easing
From the synthetic control results, data seems to indicate that any attempt to
model the Brazilian depressions should encompass mainly domestics features.
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The business cycle accounting results favor the efficiency wedge as the main
driver of the depression.
One important feature of the last decade in Brazil is the growing participation
of earmarked credit in total credit. Figure 8 presents the share of earmarked over
total amount of credit.
Figure 8: Earmarked credit share share
Source: Brazilian Central Bank.
Earmarked credit represented 36% of total credit in the end of the first quarter
of 2007. In the second quarter of 2016 the share achieved 50%. A great part
of this is issued by the BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e
Social in the Portuguese acronym).7 The public bank share in 2007 was 33.1%
of total credit, whereas its participation rose to 41.5% at the beginning of 2015,
diminishing marginally to 39.1% at the end of the sample.
Due to importance of BNDES credit in the Brazilian economy and the role
of the efficiency wedge in the Brazilian depression, a question emerges: what is
the relation between the efficiency wedge and BNDES outlays? A simple model
may help to build the expectations regarding what data might tell us.
7BNDES credit outlays are mostly with earmarked resources.
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4.3.1 A simple model
Let us work within a two-period, perfectly competitive framework. The econ-
omy has two sectors: a totally privately-funded, sector A, and a totally publicly-
funded, sector B. In the first period, agents choose the optimal allocation of
resources and, after that, the efficiency MIT shocks will manifest themselves in
the second period. Final goods output (Yt) is obtained by combining production




Each sector combines capital per unit of effective labor (ki,t, i ∈ {A, B}) ac-







where α stands for the capital per unit of effective labor share in the procution
of each sector. For sector B, this share is multiplied by θ, allowing a different
marginal productivity of capital. All markets are perfectly competitive. Firms in




ΠA,t = yA,t − rtkA,t. (8)




ΠB,t = yB,t − rtkB,t. (9)
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In perfectly competitive markets the marginal product of capital must be














is the efficiency wedge. This provides the intuition for the relationship between
the efficiency wedge and BNDES outlays. In the first period, just by accumulat-
ing more capital in sector B, aggregate total factor productivity (the efficiency
wedge) would rise. But would the wedge also rise in the second period? It de-
pends. After making all the decisions in the first period, at t = 2 there is a shock
on the productivity of each sector. If the shock is positive, the efficiency wedge
keeps rising, whereas if the shock is negative, the efficiency wedge decreases.
Therefore we have two possible scenarios: good news and bad news.
Good News Scenario
One hypothesis is that the public bank targeted projects with high social returns.
If this is the case, let us assume that after the increase in efficiency wedge in the
first period, positive spillovers would manifest in the second period, increasing
productivity in both sectors, augmenting the efficiency wedge even more. Figure
9 provides a representation of the dynamics of the efficiency wedge throughout
time under the good news scenario.
This would allow the economy to grow faster than dictated by factor accu-
mulation.
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Figure 9: Efficiency wedge with positive social returns
Bad News Scenario
What if public sector investments were made poorly? For instance, the subsi-
dized interest rate in public lending might induce an adverse selection problem
through the selection of low-return projects – that would not occur in the first
place if the interest rate was higher. If this was the case, in the second period, a
negative shock on the productivity of sector B would produce negative spillovers
on sector A. Therefore, the efficiency wedge would fall at t = 2, as is represented
in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Efficiency wedge with negative social returns
What does the data tell us?
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4.3.2 VAR analysis
In order to answer the question of which scenario describes better what hap-
pened in Brazil, a unrestricted VAR was estimated with the efficiency wedge
from the BCA (Act ) and the log of BNDES outlays (B
c
t ; HP filtered and seasonally
adjusted). Both original series were multiplied by a 1999-crisis dummy (δ1999),
which assumes a value equals to two between the first quarter of 1996 and the
last quarter of 2001, and a value equals to one from the first quarter of 2002 to




































where β0 is the vector of constants, β1 and β2 are matrices of coefficients and
ǫAt and ǫ
B
t stand for the errors. The Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information
criteria favor the model with two lags. Figure 11 presents the ten-period accu-
mulated response of the efficiency wedge to a one standard deviation shock on
BNDES outlays using the Cholesky decomposition (results are robust to changes
in variables order) with 95% confidence intervals (doted lines).
Figure 11: Response of the efficiency wedge to BNDES outlays
The point estimation for the response of the efficiency wedge initially rises,
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but the accumulated effect is negative (and statistically significant) from the sixth
quarter onwards. This corroborates with the idea of a “bad news case" as de-
scribed before. By choosing projects with low efficiency, the long run effects may
be negative. During the sample period, this long run effects may have been offset
by new outlays, whereas de depression may also be a combination of too much
credit and a fall in this “Brazilian Quantitative Easing", in a sort of balance-sheet
recession for both public and private agents.
The results are in line with the evidence that government-driven credit ex-
pansion in Brazil, since they have been destined to larger and older firms, may
have served as counter-cyclical measure, but its continuity may have distorted
resources allocation (Bonomo et al., 2015). Moreover, the subsidies seem to have
no impact on market valuation and investment, only on the cost of funding, at
least for publicly-traded companies (Lazzarini et al., 2015).
4.4 Detailed economy
The importance of the public bank in the credit market justifies a model that not
only i) has a domestic trigger for the depression, ii) has an efficiency wedge as
the main driver of economic fluctuations, but also encompasses the role of the
BNDES in the Brazilian economy. With all that in mind, the model from Gertler
& Karadi (2011) is adapted to analyze to depressions. The model was originally
used to evaluate quantitative easing policies (QE). In some sense, the BNDES is
responsible for a sort of Brazilian QE.
Households
A continuum of identical households save, consume and supply labor. A fraction
f of the households members is composed by bankers. The probability of staying















subject to a budget constraint given by
Ct = WtLt + Πt − Tt + RtBt − Bt+1 (12)
where Ct is consumption, Lt stands for labor, Bt+1 and Rt are the short term debt
and its gross real return; Πt is the transfer from households to those entering in
the banking business and Tt are lump-sum taxes. The first order conditions are:
(Ct − hCt−1)
−1 − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)









The financial firm j obtains funds from households’ savings in bonds and its
stock of wealth, Nj,t. Given the relative price (Qt) on financial claims, the total
lend to non-financial companies (Sj,t) evolves according to the following balance
sheet dynamics:
QtSj,t = Nj,t + Bj,t+1. (16)
The evolution of banker’s capital is given by:
Nj,t+1 = Rk,t+1QtSj,t − Rt+1Bj,t+1. (17)
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Replacing the balance sheet dynamics into the previous equations yields:
Nj,t+1 = QtSj,t(Rk,t+1 − Rt+1) + Rt+1Nj,t. (18)
Let Λt,t+1 = λt+1/λt and define βtΛt,t+1 as the stochastic discount factor
for each banker. The risk-adjusted premium is thus EtβtΛt,t+1(Rk,t+1 − Rt+1) ≥
0, ∀t. Financial intermediates maximize expected wealth (Vj,t) and to to avoid an
indefinitely expansion of assets (moral hazard problem), funds will flow to the
banker if
Vj,t ≥ ΩQtSj,t, (19)
where Ω is the fraction of funds the banker diverts instead of transferring them
back to households. Therefore, the expected wealth is equal to:
Vj,t = vtQtSj,t + ηtNj,t, (20)
with
vt = Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(Rk,t+1 − Rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1vt+1], (21)









where vt is the expected discounted marginal gain of expanding assets and ηt
is the expected discounted gain of marginal wealth given the amount of assets.
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Nj,t = φtNj,t, (25)
where φt is the leverage ratio. Assume it is the the same for each firm and we
have:
QtSt = φtNt. (26)
Banker’s net wealth evolves according the following dynamics:
Nj,t+1 = (φt(Rk,t+1 − Rt+1) + Rt+1)Nj,t. (27)
Total net wealth (Nt) is a combination of the net wealth of existing bankers
(Ne,t)
Ne,t = θ[(Rk,t − Rt)φt−1 + Rt]Nt−1, (28)
and the net wealth of new bankers (Nn,t), financed with “start up" money from
households. The resources are a fraction (ω) of end-of-period assets of existing
bankers:
Nn,t = ωQtSt−1. (29)
The law of motion of Nt may be rewritten as follows:
Nt = θ[(Rk,t − Rt)φt−1 + Rt]Nt−1 + ωQtSt−1. (30)
Credit Policy
The government issues debt to households to fund its credit policy. The cost
of debt is the riskless interest rate and it lends to non-financial firms at market
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lending rates. However, government intermediation occurs inefficiently, bearing
costs (τ) per unit of government loan (QtSg,t). Public debt (Bg,t) will fund a
fraction (ψt) of fund, i.e.:
QtSg,t = ψtQtSt, (31)
Bg,t = ψtQtSt, (32)
Therefore, total amount of credit is the sum of private loans (Sp,t) and public
loans:
QtSt = QtSp,t + QtSg,t, (33)
where φc,t = 1/(1 − ψt).
4.4.1 Intermediate goods firms
Value of capital acquired should be equal to the value of the claims to acquire
capital:
QtKt+1 = QtSt. (34)




where At is, Kt is the stock of capital, Ut stands for the utilization of capital and
ξt is the shock in the value of capital, which is assumed to follow an AR process.
Producers maximize profits taking the price of intermediate goods as given and
accounting for the costs of replacing capital (δ(Ut) = U
1+ζ




















Capital producing firms also maximize profits by choosing net investment (In,t)
subject to adjustment costs ( f (In,t, In,t−1)). Optimal choice is given by
Qt = 1 + ηi(In,t, In,t−1)− EtβΛt,t+1ηi(In,t+1, In,t). (39)
Final goods producers
From a cost minimization problem each the demand for each input (Yf ,t) is given
by




which depends of each input’s price (Pf ,t), relative to total price index (Pt), given




P1−ǫf ,t d f ]
1
1−ǫ . (41)
Final goods producers set prices in a la Calvo, maximizing expected profits

























Government and Central Bank
Differently from Gertler & Karadi (2011), government spending (Gt) is not con-
stant. It is assumed evolve according to the following dynamics:
Gt = Gt−1 + ǫ
G
t , (45)
where ǫGt represents a fiscal policy shock and it is assumed to follow an AR(1)
process. The economy’s resource constraint thus becomes:






− 1)2(In,t + Iss) + G + τψtQtKt+1. (46)
The government expenditure is financed via lump-sum taxes and govern-
ment financial intermediation
G + τψtQtKt+1 = Tt + (Rk,t − Rt)Bg,t−1. (47)
Monetary policy decisions are emulated by a Taylor rule (in this paper, a
modified version than the one used in Gertler & Karadi (2011)):8
8Gertler & Karadi (2011) use minus the price markup as a proxy for the output gap; more-
over, they assume a slightly differente functional form.
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it = (1 − ρ)(rNt + κπEtπt+1 + κy(ln Yt − ln Y)) + ρit−1 + ǫit, (48)
where lnYt − ln Y is the output gap and rNt is the natural real interest rate that
would prevail within a flexible prices context (equals to the marginal product of
capital). The real interest rate is obtained by the Fisher equation:




Finally, the dynamics of the public development, BNDES. The idea is that
the bank injects resources on the economy considering its sensitivity to credit
spreads and an exogenous shock (ǫψt ), which can encompass other determinants
of the loans that are not technical, such as political will.
ψt = ψ + νEt[(log Rk,t+1 − log Rt+1)− (log Rk − log Rt)] + ǫ
ψ
t . (50)
After describing the model, the next section presents the output dynamics
prescribed by the model, as well as the observed data.
4.4.2 Calibration and simulation
The model was calibrated following mainly Gertler & Karadi (2011), with a few
exceptions for adjusting it to the Brazilian reality. For instance, the authors set
the leverage ratio in the steady state equals to 4, whereas in this paper it set to
1.5, more suitable to a greater debt intolerance within emerging markets. Table





Discount factor β 0.99 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Habit parameter h 0.815 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Relative utility weight of labor χ 3.409 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ 0.276 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Financial Intermediaries
Fraction of capital that can be diverted Ω 0.381 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Proportional transfer to the entering bankers ω 0.002 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Survival rate of the bankers θ 0.972 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Intermediate good firms
Capital share α 0.4 Ferreira et al. (2008)
Steady state depreciation rate δ(U) 0.05 Ferreira et al. (2008)
Elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to utilization rate ζ 7.200 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
AR coefficient of ξ ρξ 0.9 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Capital Producing Firms
Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital ηi 1.728 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Final goods producers
Elasticity of substitution ǫ 4.167 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Probability of keeping prices fixed γ 0.779 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Price indexation γp 0.241 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Public sector
Inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule κπ 1.5 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Output gap coefficient of the Taylor rule κy 0.50/4 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule ρ 0.8 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Steady state proportion of government expenditures GY 0.2 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
By assigning to the model the aforesaid parameters, one is able to see what
would be the prescribed path of output during the Brazilian depression. Figure
12 presents the outcome of the log-linearized version of the model with HP-filter
(Hodrick & Prescott, 1997) observed output data.
Figure 12: Output: data vs model
Notes: The outcome of a log-linearized model and the HP-filtered output data.
As can be seen, the model is able to account for the fall in output. Moreover,
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it also produces a brief marginal increase in 2016, followed by another marginal
fall. This corroborates with the idea that the credit market is important to un-
derstand the transmission of the depression.
5 Final remarks
The Brazilian economy was able to recover fast from its two-quarters recession,
in 2009, after the GFC, with a high growth rate in 2010. But not only it returned
to its usual low growth rates (for an emerging market economy), a pattern since
the 1980s, but also experienced a downward trend leading to a stagnation in
2014.
With a rare two-years GDP contraction in 2015 and 2016, a depression in the
Brazilian economy without any major event arouse mainly from a combination
of domestic factors, even though some fall in growth rates might be attributed
to the international environment.
We saw that distortions in the accumulation of production factors, the effi-
ciency wedge, is the driver of output dynamics within 2014-2016. Due to the
structure of the credit market in Brazil at the time, with a great role for ear-
marked credit, as well as the change of behavior of BNDES from its previous
consistently positive net outlays, we investigated how the efficiency wedge re-
sponds to the public bank lending.
Even though the efficiency wedge has a positive response from an increase in
BNDES’ outlays, it vanishes shortly and is replaced by a negative (and stronger)
response. This corroborates with the idea that subsidized credit at the time
might have been poorly allocated, an hypothesis we raised from the econometric
evidence and systematized with a very simple model. Further research on the
matter is due, though.
We also considered the role of the public development bank in a more com-
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pleted set up, embedding not only the dynamics of government spending, a
central bank and households, but also the dynamics with credit market fric-
tions. The model able to account for output dynamics and the response of the
economy to BNDES’ outlays, as well as the importance of the indebteness of
other agents during the Brazilian Depression.
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The data from CODACE can be accessed in this report (in Portuguese).
Data for the BCA exercises in detailed below:
• GDP: Gross domestic product in current values for the first quarter of 1996.
For the second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• Consumption: Household consumption in current values for the first quar-
ter of 1996. For the second quarter onwards real growth was applied.
Source: IBGE
• Durables goods consumption: Household consumption multiplied by durables
goods consumption share. Author’s calculation.
• Durables goods consumption share: using Brazilian input-output matri-
ces from IBGE for years 2000 and 2005, the share was calculate following
Ellery Jr et al. (2002); from 2006 to 2015, only a random shock was consid-
ered (using excel, a pseudo random number from a Normal distribution
with mean equals to zero and variance equals to the series variance - seed:
13).
• Investment: Investment in current values for the first quarter of 1996. For
the second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• Exports: Exports in current values for the first quarter of 1996. For the
second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• Imports: Exports in current values for the first quarter of 1996. For the
second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• National accounts growth: Quarterly real growth. Source: OECD Statistics.
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• Hours of Work: Average Annual Hours Worked by Persons Engaged for
Brazil. For 2015 the same value of 2014 was used. Source: Penn World
Table.
• Population: Working age population (15-64). For 2013, 2014 and 2015, the
values were estimated using the average growth between 2012 and 1992.
Source: OECD Statistics.
• Total earmarked credit: Data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
• Total non-earmarked credit: Data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
• BNDES outlays: Data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
Synthetic control
The sample used in the synthetic control estimation and the weights for the the
synthetic Brazil are given by Tables 6 and 7 below.
Table 6: Full sample
Antigua and Barbuda Argentina The Bahamas Barbados
Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile
Colombia Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Republic
Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala
Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica
Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay
Peru St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela
Table 7: Country weights
Country Weight
Belize 0.089
Ecuador 0.091
Guyana 0.178
Mexico 0.254
Peru 0.355
Venezuela 0.033
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